A Different View of Insurgencies

Ben J. Tria Kerkvliet

HDN DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
No. 5

HDN Discussion Papers are commissioned by HDN for the purpose of producing the publication entitled, *In Search of A Human Face: 15 Years of Knowledge Building on Human Development in the Philippines*. This research is funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Papers under the Discussion Paper Series are unedited and unreviewed.

The views and opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Network.

Not for quotation without permission from the author(s) and the Network.

For comments, suggestions and further inquiries, please contact:
Room 334, School of Economics, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City
+632 927 8009 +632 927 9686 loc 334
http://www.hdn.org.ph
A Different View of Insurgencies

BENEDICT J. TRIA KERKVLIET

In 2005, the Human Development Network (HDN) produced its fifth *Philippine Human Development Report* (PHDR) since 1994. Unlike the first four, which emphasized economic matters, this one examined a political issue: human security and two armed conflicts that have affected many Filipinos and their communities during the past four decades.

Although collaboratively prepared, the *PHDR 2005* is well written and presented, thanks to its three main contributors: Arsenio Balisacan, Emmanuel de Dios, and Toby Monsod. Three of its four chapters analyze the “communist and Moro insurgencies.” The first, and the most ambitious, chapter equals half of the study’s 114 pages of text. Drawing on a wealth of survey, statistical, and qualitative data, this chapter is an engaging and sophisticated analysis of the insurgencies’ causes and their costs, particularly for human development and security. Chapters 2 and 3 go deeper into each insurgency’s evolution. The final chapter shifts from armed conflict to focus on updating the provincial human development indices (HDIs), which were initiated in earlier reports from the HDN.

Few studies of insurgency in the Philippines look at the armed conflicts in predominantly Muslim parts of the country and also at those elsewhere in the country. Consequently, by examining both clusters, the *Report* makes a major contribution to analytical literature on insurgencies. Particularly significant is that the study finds several similarities in the underlying factors fuelling unrest and violence. Another accomplishment is that the *PHDR 2005* combines new data with secondary sources in order to analyze carefully the costs of the protracted armed conflicts in the Philippines. Also very informative is the study’s analysis of bias in Philippine society against Muslims.

In the four years since the *Report*’s publication, fighting between insurgent and government forces has continued, mostly in the same provinces with the highest number of armed encounters listed in *Table 1.1* of the *PHDR 2005*. Although the frequency of armed clashes has been less than was the case during the 1980s, it has been more than in the early 2000s.

In line with one of its recommendations, peace talks between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippine government did resume. Indeed, they reconvened several times, although each one collapsed. In 2008, for instance, talks stopped after the Supreme Court ruled that a key provision in a tentative agreement about ancestral homelands for Muslims was unconstitutional [Hicken 2009:193-195]. Negotiations between the government and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) have not yet resumed since breaking down in 2005, but both sides continue to have informal discussions that may contribute to re-establishing formal peace talks.

The *PHDR 2005* says the “the communist and Moro insurgencies” are “ideology-based armed conflicts.” Ideology-based armed conflicts, says the *Report*, espouse “alternative state-visions” aimed at replacing the existing political system with another type. Participants in communist insurgencies, the *Report* adds, are fighting to establish a communist or socialist political economic system and government. For participants in the second, the ideology is Moro nationalism: they seek a new nation, Bangsamoro, independent or at least autonomous from the Philippines and be perhaps an Islamic state.
The study is certainly not alone in using these terms and ideologies for the armed struggles in the Philippines. Such characterizations are ubiquitous in government accounts, news reports, and academic publications. But material in the *PHDR 2005* itself and some other studies makes one wonder whether these struggles are based on communist and Moro nationalist ideologies.

Drawing on a variety of evidence, the *PHDR 2005* develops a sophisticated investigation into the reasons for insurgency. Its main finding for both insurgencies is that although poverty *per se* is not a cause, deprivation and injustice “lie at the heart of armed conflict.” Deprivations include lack of water, health care, education, and roadways. Injustices include rural families having no or too little land from which to make a living and being cheated or eased out of their fields.

The *Report* does not show that communism, Islamic nationalism, or any other recognizable “ideology” has much to do with the conflicts’ causes or objectives. It claims that people living in these circumstances of deprivation and injustice become “receptive to competing-state ideologies,” which can therefore “mobilize large masses and sections of society.” But the *Report* does not support this claim with evidence, which is puzzling given that the study is otherwise impressively evidence-based.

Instead of accepting terms used in conventional but often poorly informed accounts, the *Report* could firmly question the “communist insurgency” and “Moro insurgency” terminology. And given the evidence it does marshal, it could have offered more appropriate summary descriptions for the unrest. “Justice insurgencies,” for example, would better describe what the two armed struggles seek rather than saying they are “ideology-based communist and Moro insurgencies.”

Findings in various studies bolster the need to question claims that the armed conflicts are based on “communist” and “Moro” ideologies.

**The “communist insurgency”**

The CPP and its leaders were major players in the armed unrest in numerous non-Muslim parts of the country during the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, the party has withered and splintered, but continues to have a few thousand members.² The New People’s Army (NPA) is the armed organization that the CPP claims to control and use to fight government troops in order to defend and advance the revolution. The number of NPA members is much less than the 25,000 it had in the late 1980s. But the armed organization has been rebuilding and in recent years has had between 7,000 and 12,000 members.³ In addition to these two organizations, CPP leaders claim to have the support of the National Democratic Front (NDF) with thousands of members in “mass organizations” and millions of other people across the country.

But two issues here need probing: Are CPP members committed to communism? And are the thousands of armed NPA and the tens of thousands of NPA supporters communists?

Too little research has been done on what CPP members really believe, why they joined the party, and what they think the party stands for and is struggling to achieve. But available evidence suggests that the degree of commitment to a communist ideology has been shallow, especially after party leaders relaxed recruitment methods and the criteria for membership. Membership then increased rapidly such that in 1980, the CPP claimed 10,000 members, five times its 1972 figure.⁴ At that point there were signs of ideological superficiality.
In Mindanao, one of the fastest growing areas for CPP recruits, leaders saw “pervasive ‘ideological problems’ within the organization.” A 1980 party evaluation, according to a scholar who studies the CPP, said that despite the rapid increase in membership, “Mindanao communism’s ‘party-building’ phase was notably weak. The absence of a ‘systematic educational campaign’ was paralleled by cadres’ ‘limited familiarity with Marxist tools’” [Abinales 1996:176].

Little understanding of and commitment to CPP teachings on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism worsened as party membership in the Philippines jumped to 35,000 by 1986. In Davao alone, party membership jumped from 50 in 1978 to 1,000 in 1985. Political education and “ideological deepening” did not keep up with this expansion. Consequently, “new recruits joined not because they were attracted to Marxism (or Maoism), but to avenge personal, family, or community tragedies caused by military abuses. Even among supposedly more sophisticated groups like students, the level of analytical sophistication and ideological understanding was inadequate.” A 1989 party document lamented that as the party grew, “political and organizational education of cadres was...mainly informal...and ‘on-the-job,’ and their instruction on Marxism was limited and never systematic.... [C]adre training was...slow...and... not formal” [Abinales 2006:196 and Abinales 2008:178, 166-174].

Lack of ideological cohesion as well as profound disagreements about methods of struggle and how best to deal with new political conditions in the country after the “people power” overthrow of the Marcos regime contributed significantly to splits and splits within splits in the CPP during the 1990s and into the 2000s. These and other weaknesses also help to explain why CPP leaders in Mindanao and elsewhere launched internal investigations to expose supposed infiltrators and spies. The campaign ended up killing hundreds of CPP members and other activists and causing chaos in the party, the NPA, and mass organizations. Perhaps, after all that turmoil, CPP members today are more united around a communist ideology. But this cannot be assumed; it requires investigation.

We now come to the second question about the motivations of NPA members and supporters. Available evidence on this question is rather clear: A large majority of the guerrilla fighters and their civilian supporters have neither been CPP members, believers in communism, nor seekers of a communist-run state. They have been, as an unnamed source in the PHDR 2005 put it, “primarily...peasants committed to armed struggle as the means to obtain a degree of social justice.” Hundreds of thousands of peasants supported the NPA, wrote one long-time activist drawing on publications from the CPP and NDF and on studies by outsiders, because the guerrilla army and its organizations provided people with real benefits....Bandits were punished and a rudimentary form of justice imposed where none existed. Land rents and interest rates were lowered and where landlords resisted and brought in the military, lands were confiscated and redistributed [Rocamora 1994: 20].

An example of the motivations and objectives of NPA members is that of a sugar plantation worker in Negros cited by Rutten [2009:432, 435].

[In the 1980s, he joined the NPA] because of his keen awareness of *inhustisya* (injustice), in particular worker poverty and rights violations; his disappointment in the leftwing clergy, who failed to show how to change the oppressive social system; and the persistent recruitment efforts of a CPP-NPA organizer from another hacienda. His primary goal, he explained, was to improve the lot of hacienda workers by fighting landlord oppression and military repression. The CPP-NPA offered the means to do so.
His motivations are similar to those of some NPA members in Nueva Ecija in 1987 to 1990. Their goals, too, had to do with better living conditions. In elaborating what this would mean, one NPA member talked about raising wages and redistributing land so that workers and peasants could have “a decent standard of living, so their children can go to school, so they don’t get sick from malnourishment.” The goal, he said, is for workers and peasants to be more or less equal “to those for whom they work, to whom they sell rice, and to other people they deal with.”

Many NPA members had similar objectives, which might better be termed “reformist” rather than “revolutionary.” What often pushed them to join the underground movement was repression. One of the guerrilla army’s foremost leaders commented after he had left the movement that military abuses, killings, and other forms of violent repression were “principal recruiter(s) for the NPA” [“Panayam kay Dante” 1987:22]. Lots of Filipinos are poor, oppressed, and critical of the political and economic system in which they must struggle to survive. Many get involved in individual and collective efforts aimed at changing the conditions engulfing them.

What frequently drives people to resort to armed rebellion, argues one analytical investigation into this matter, is the state’s own violence against them. The “repressive machinery of the state” commonly defends agricultural businesses, political monopolies, and large landowners against ordinary people’s efforts to rectify injustices and demand reforms. In the face of violent repression people “reach a point at which they say, there is no hope for change through peaceful organized participation in the political system” and they turn to “...organizations ready to work illegally for similar goals, but explicitly through the use of violence—armed revolution” [Hawes 1990:291-292, 294].

Fine-grained studies of how oppressed Filipinos come to support and join the NPA show that the process is complicated. Rarely do repression, misery, and exploitation take people directly to supporting or joining armed rebellion. Those conditions predispose people to take action toward redressing injustices, but other factors affect whether or not people begin to organize or rebel.

Often, one intervening factor is learning from others already involved in collective struggles change. The learning includes developing an analytical framework that helps people to combine the immediate or local causes of their poverty and repression with root, systemic causes in the political-economic system. People also learn a language by which to articulate their grievances, objectives, and demands. In numerous parts of the Philippines, the framework and vocabulary most influential for workers and peasants has come from NPA recruiters and organizers.

But labor unions, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and various progressive Christian groups have also been significant teachers and mobilizers. Indeed, in many parts of the Visayas and Mindanao, NPA activists have built on frameworks and vocabulary that people already know from their labor union involvement, Basic Christian Community experiences, and liberation theology exposures.

For some NPAs, usually those holding leadership positions in the organization, a communist ideology is part of their framework and vocabulary. But for most ordinary members and supporters, that is not the case. Their framework in most NPA areas is the systemic oppression of the many by a few in Philippine society, and they speak in terms of liberation from exploitation; equality, no poor and no rich; and their rights to political influence, land, and decent living conditions.
In the Cordillera region, the framework and language for NPA members and supporters had some of these components, but it also had others that, besides not being a communist ideology, ran contrary to the nationalism that the CPP-NPA leadership championed. For many in Abra, Kalinga, and the Mountain Province who joined the NPA to fight against government-initiated “development” projects that infringed on highlanders’ land, property, and community-use rights, the guerrilla movement evolved into a struggle for Cordillera identity and regional autonomy.\(^{12}\)

In recent years, people’s motivation for joining or supporting the NPA may not only have little or nothing to do with communism but little to do with justice. Some analysts suggest that the guerrilla organization has become a kind of business enterprise that sells protection in exchange for money and other compensation. Its “customers” include corporations, gambling and drug syndicates, government agencies, and large landowners [Magno 2007:314, 321-327]. According to this analysis, NPA members are akin to employees who receive monthly wages; local NPA leaders are akin to branch managers; and high NPA officials are the enterprise’s central managers and board members. Further research is needed to determine the extent to which this characterization is accurate for the entire NPA or only some units within it.\(^{13}\)

The “Moro insurgency”

At first glance, the terminology, the “Moro insurgency,” might appear defensible in that the people involved are presumably Moros. But even here the evidence in the PHDR 2005 justifies questioning this characterization.

An outstanding feature of the Report is the data summarizing the deprivation and injustice that Muslim Filipinos have suffered during the last 30 years or so. Provinces with the highest proportion of Muslims are among the most deprived in the country, having some of the highest levels of poverty and infant mortality and some of the lowest rates of life expectancy and educational attainment. Muslim Filipinos are also victims of discrimination and persecution.

The basic causes of their insurgency, the Report concludes, are economic marginalization and destitution, political domination and “inferiorization,” physical insecurity, a threatened Islamic identity, a perception of the government being responsible for these conditions, and a perception of hopelessness. These, the Report says, are “the roots of the Moro problem.”\(^{14}\) Other studies of the insurgency have also stressed some or all of these factors.\(^{15}\) And the dismal situation has not improved, judging from more recent statistical data in the latest PHDR 2008/2009. Provinces in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago with large proportions of Muslims remain among the poorest and among those with the lowest per capita incomes and lowest HDIs.

So, a major reason to question whether the insurgency is ideologically based is that it grows from socioeconomic adversities in Muslim areas of the Philippines.

The PHDR 2005 has little evidence that Muslims are driven or motivated by a Moro ideology or even a sense of Moro identity. Indeed, another hallmark of the Report is its attention to the various ethnolinguistic groups within the country’s Muslim population: Maranao and Maguindanao, each with about 25 percent of the Muslims in the Philippines; Tausog, with about 20 percent; Yakan, between 4 and 9 percent; Iranon, 4 our percent; and several smaller groups composing 15 percent to 17 percent. The extent to which people in these various groups see themselves as “Moro” is debatable. Analysts argue that Moro
identity is, at best, a recent phenomenon—within the last three or four decades at most—and probably not widely shared among Muslims in these several ethnolinguistic groups.\textsuperscript{16}

Even among those who join or support armed insurgencies the importance of Moro nationalism is unclear. Indicative is each of the several armed rebel organizations among Muslims in the Philippines since the early 1970s has been concentrated in a different ethnolinguistic group. The MNLF, one of the two largest, is primarily composed of Tausog people; the MILF, the other large armed organization, has mostly Maguindano people. As one analyst writes, “power rivalry among the Maguindanao, Maranao, and Tausug [Tausog] ethnic groups” is a prominent dynamic among the armed insurgent Muslims in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{17}

Moreover, each ethnolinguistic group of insurgents is often split along clan, familial, generational, and other cleavages as well as rivalries among leaders, further undercutting the idea that the armed rebels are united by and fighting for a Moro nationalist ideology.\textsuperscript{18} Although the Abu Sayyaf, another armed Muslim group, is also primarily Tausog in composition, it is not united with the MNLF are; indeed, they are often antagonistic to each other.

Numerous leaders of the MNLF, MILF, Abu Sayyaf, and less well known insurgent organizations have espoused Moro nationalism and claimed that their organizations are continuing a long struggle against foreign rule of Muslims in the Philippine archipelago. Leaders have also said they and the organizations’ fighters seek autonomy from, or even full independence from, the Philippines, so that the Moros can rule themselves. Some insurgent organizations’ leaders have also said they fight not only to have an autonomous or independent government but also one that will rule through Islamic law, although that objective has been inconsistent.\textsuperscript{19}

Apparently these leaders’ stances are the primary reasons many analysts claim that the insurgencies are based on a Moro nationalist ideology. But this ignores or sidelines the point just made about ethnolinguistic differences among Muslims in the Philippines and the cleavages and rivalries among—and within—the various armed organizations. Moreover, such characterizations privilege leaders rather than seriously examining the views of other participants and their reasons for joining or supporting armed insurgencies.

For some people, Moro nationalism or commitment to Islam is a fundamental reason for endorsing armed Muslim groups. But for most, there is considerable evidence to corroborate the \textit{PHDR 2005}’s finding that deprivation and injustice are the bases for their involvement.

“Some Muslims join armed groups, like the MILF, in the name of \textit{jihad}. It inspires them to sacrifice their lives for the cause of religion. Moreover, it gives them an identity, a status, social support and a purpose in life.” But, continue the authors of this observation, “underneath this Islamic veneer...is the stark reality that fuels the Muslim rebellion in Mindanao: economic and social exclusion....Ordinary people—unemployed, with little or no social status, meager education, and finances—join the MILF driven by need. They turn to violence for a solution to their economic and social problems.” Hence, the “ideological gap between the leaders and the rank and file is wide and palpable.” According to the study, “The rank and file [in the MILF] don’t talk of preserving Islam but of military abuses and of their need for land and livelihood. In fact, a number left the rebel group when jobs and land came their way” [Vitug and Gloria 2000:112, 116].

Abu Sayyaf leaders attracted members in 2001 not by appealing to Moro or any other identity nor by invoking Islam, according to a recent article. Rather, they offered each recruit
“a high-powered rifle and a monthly salary of P50,000.” Later, when the leaders could no longer pay them, the “bulk of fighters and supporters returned home to resume their ordinary maritime and agricultural pursuits....” The Abu Sayyaf, concludes the article, is not one organization but a number of “armed gangs” that are “actually independent” of the main group carrying the name and “do not share the political Islamist ideology of its core leaders.” Even within the main Abu Sayyaf group, fighters may not subscribe to this ideology. Rather, their “interests, motives, and commitments” may well vary from person to person. To the extent the group has an ideology, it is essentially a commitment to kinship ties and interpersonal relationships between leader and follower [Ugarte 2008: 135-136, 139].

An in-depth study by McKenna [1998] in Cotabato found that “ordinary fighters and followers of the separatist rebellion held views and produced symbols of the armed struggle that differed markedly from those promoted by movement leaders.” One major difference was “how rarely any of the insurgents, in expressing their motivations for taking up arms or fighting on against great odds, made spontaneous mention of either the Moro nation (Bangsamoro) or Islamic renewal...” Despite years of hearing “appeals to Bangsamoro nationhood” from armed organizations’ leaders and pronouncements, the insurgents and their non-combatant relatives and neighbors refer to themselves as Muslims or “by the name of their particular ethnolinguistic group, rather than identify themselves as ‘Moros.’”

Current and former insurgents talk of defending their cultural traditions and local communities, their property and livelihood, and their lives, not of defending or promoting a Moro nation, the study notes. Indeed, “a powerful impetus for joining or supporting the separatist insurgents” has been “terror at the hands of the Philippine military.” For many Muslims, the insurgent armies have been major ways of trying to protect themselves and their communities and to avenge the deaths, mayhem and destruction that government troops cause.

Another marked difference concerns the meaning and practice of Islam, according to McKenna [1998]. MILF leaders, ulama, and ustadzes (Islamic teachers) advocate an “Islamic renewal program” of “doctrinal purification and the rejection of Western cultural influence.” Some of the renewal program has gone down well with ordinary Muslims fighters, especially the Islamic teachings about “political equality and economic justice.” But many other aspects “provoked considerable resistance from community residents.” They particularly oppose renewal leaders’ efforts to squash popular beliefs in spiritual figures and saints and in long-practiced rituals during funerals and weddings.

To many Muslim fighters and their supporters, advocates of Islamic renewal “seek to formalize and Arabize” the Islam that people actually practice and which “needs no reforming other than to remind local Muslims of its essential message of brotherhood and uncomplicated spirituality. The new ulama lack the moral authority to lead Philippine Muslims because they are concerned only with surface manifestations of Islam and lack the wisdom to recognize its essence when they see it.” Ordinary Muslims “seek to revive not the universal idealized Islamic but the local idealized past when saints dwelt in the homeland and Islamic brotherhood was expressed in everyday life.” They are “yearning for a particular idealized past that is not a place of puritanism and intolerance but one of fellowship and reciprocity....” [Mckenna 2002: 550, 552-553].
Accurate labeling

Calling the insurgencies what they are actually about rather than continuing to use conventional terminology would augment the PHDR 2005’s recommendations. The Report calls for a consistent and common “framework for peace” that can support a “national constituency for peace.” It stresses the need to involve the general public so that a large proportion of the Filipino people can “own the process” of ending the fighting. More accurate terminology would help to accomplish these sensible recommendations.

The insurgencies are much more about injustice, deprivation, exploitation, and repression than they are about communism and Moro nationalism. They seek justice far more than they seek communist or Moro states. Hence, calling them insurgencies for justice rather than insurgencies for communism or Moroland would be more accurate and help to broaden public interest in unrest and its causes. Talking about the insurgencies as communist and Moro facilitates the very thing that the Report counsels against—letting the unrest be relegated to the margins of society, sold by politicians as terrorism, etc.—rather than seeing the conflicts as “a pressing question of human development and human security that touches all Filipinos.”

Talking about justice as the basis of these insurgencies would also help the Report’s recommendation that the “mainstream of political life” be broadened to include “the radical Left.” The “radical Left” refers largely to organizations advocating a more equitable distribution of wealth and power in the Philippines, decent living conditions for workers and peasants, and protection for all citizens against state violence. Such organizations have indeed encountered enormous obstacles and hardships when trying to participate in elections, policy debates, and so forth.

One reason for such difficulties is that journalists, academics, and others have too readily labeled them “radical Left” and “communist,” thereby reinforcing rather than correcting the terminology that powerful perpetrators of injustice use. Such labeling helps to condition the general public to marginalize the organizations and show little concern about their exclusion from the country’s main political processes and institutions.

More accurate labeling of the insurgencies would also boost the Report’s emphasis on human development for its own sake and to counter rebellion. Calling the insurgencies “communist” and “Moro” encourages military responses from the government. Summary terms that highlight what the rebellions are largely about will encourage responses from governmental and international agencies that emphasize education, sanitation, land distribution, roads, health delivery, employment, and other measures that will reduce deprivation and injustice.
Notes

1 A notable example, published three years after the *PHDR 2005*, is Rutten [2008 b]. The book includes studies of the Moro National Liberation Front-Bangsamoro Army (MNLF-BMA) in Muslim areas as well as the New People’s Army (NPA) and the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA) in predominantly Christian lowland and upland parts of the country.

2 I have yet to find estimates of current CPP membership.


5 The Davao figures are from Jones [1989:135], while the number for the CPP’s total membership comes from Rocamora [1994:9].


7 Abinales [2008: 146, 165, 171]. For an up-close and personal account from a former party member in Luzon, see Garcia [2001].

8 The plantation worker eventually joined the CPP. He left both the CPP and the NPA in the late 1980s. He continued, however, to press for better living conditions for agricultural workers, even while briefly on the payroll of Philippine military. In his various forms of activism—union organizer, community organizer, Basic Christian Community advocate, and local leader in the revolutionary movement—he “perceived himself persistently as a social reformer.”

9 Lengthy conversation, 31 July 1987, rural Nueva Ecija. This man, in his mid-20s, was not a CPP member. He came from a long line of impoverished peasant families. He had joined the NPA in the early 1980s. In June 1989, he was killed, along with some other NPA guerrillas, in a gun battle with the Philippine military.

10 This paragraph draws primarily on the scholarship of Rutten [1996, 2000, 2003, 2008 a] and Collier [1997:chs 5-7].

11 For a sophisticated analysis of the interaction between state repression and underground resistance, see Boudreau [2008].

12 For an engaging analysis of this matter, see Finin [2008].

13 Franco [2006:143] and Borras and Franco [2006:286-88] cite areas in which the NPA protects large landowners against peasant groups pressing for land reform. The landowners pay the NPA a “revolutionary tax.” Collecting money may well be a motive in itself; another, the authors suggest, is that by siding with landlords the NPA is trying to scuttle the Philippine government’s agrarian reform program. Another researcher finds NPA members in Ifugao province changed from helping and protecting villagers in the 1970s-1980s to stealing from and burdening them in the 1990s [Kwiatkowski 2008:240-62].

14 This is unfortunate phraseology given that the Report’s own remarkable data show that the problem is not “Moro.” The problem is what other people, organizations, and governments do to Muslims in the Philippines. Some analysts, including some who follow Islam, add that also part of the problem are the political and economic elites within Muslim parts of the Philippines who have long exploited their own people. For an overview of this aspect, see Diaz [2003:7-12], which draws heavily on publications by Muslim writers in the Philippines. Also see Abinales [2007:280-84].

15 For example, Buendia [2006:166-74], Gutierrez and Borras [2004], Muslim [1994:117-30], Nuñez-Tolibas [1997:49ff, 83], and Rasul [2003].


References


