Peace, Human Security and Human Development

Highlights of the 2005 Philippine Human Development Report
(download at www.hdn.org.ph)
Human security

- not security of a regime or state but the security of real people
- human security as freedom.
  - from fear
  - from want
  - from humiliation and prejudice
- the external precondition for human development

We are interested in human security not only for its spillover effects and interaction with human development outcomes but also as a right in itself
Analytical framework

(Ideology-based) Armed conflict

Human insecurity

Low human development outcomes
## Costs of conflict (Table 1.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nonmonetary</th>
<th>Economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local costs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>deaths and injuries among combatants and civilians due to fighting; deaths</td>
<td>destruction of property and infrastructure;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and morbidity from displacement and diaspora</td>
<td>lost output; military spending on both sides; social spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td>loss of cultural identity and social cohesion; loss of personal dignity</td>
<td>foregone investment; alternative use of local resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spillover costs</td>
<td>prejudice; ethnic and social tensions; rise in kidnap-for-ransom, drug</td>
<td>lost output; foregone investment; alternative use of national funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trafficking and other illegal activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nonmonetary cost: Loss of human life

- Combatants and non-combatants. Little systematic documentation. Figures are tentative and incomplete.
  - From 1986-2004, 4700 combatants killed and 1500 wounded, or 260 killed and 85 injured every year due to both Moro and CPP conflicts [see Bautista, 2005].
  - From 1970-1996, around 100,000 killed due to Moro conflict, of which 20% were non-combatants [E. Ermita].
  - From 1969-1976, during the fiercest fighting between the government and MNLF, 60,000 estimated killed, 54,000 wounded and 350,000 displaced [see Box 2.4]

Note: To extent that the Communist insurgency is less willing or able to engage in positional warfare, loss of noncombatant lives may not be as great.
Figure 1.1 Number of armed encounters
Nonmonetary cost: Loss of human life


- Child soldiers.
  - Both sides have utilized children, putting their future and lives at risk. Government took children ‘volunteers’ into CAFGU units in the 1980s and 1990s.
  - An upsurge in the recruitment of children by NPA seems to have occurred. The military estimates about 25% of NPA recruits are children.
  - Independent reports have also documented children being employed as regular combatants, members of liquidation squads, armed guards and in other various roles.
Nonmonetary cost: Internal Displacement

- Dwarfs any other immediate human cost of armed conflict in terms of number directly affected.
  - From 1986-1991, during the ‘total war’ against the NPA, 1.2 million people were displaced. From 1990-1992, some 30,000 people were dislocated in Apayao.
  - From the 1970s, as many as 2 million people may have experienced dislocation due to the Moro conflict. On a flow basis, around 1.4 million displaced from 2000-2004.

- Largest increases in internally displaced persons have occurred when government launches major offenses.
- The toll among evacuees even in the relative ‘safety’ of evacuation centers – disease, lack of food - cannot be ignored.
Nonmonetary cost: Diaspora and Discrimination

- Anywhere from 1/5 to 1/3 of major Muslim ethnic groups now live in areas outside their ancestral homeland, some reduced to virtual Muslim ghettos [OMA, 2000]
- People of the Diaspora face a breakdown in social cohesion and indignity suffered by previously productive people now reduced to penury or compelled to engage in offensive or derogatory activities.
- Discrimination and prejudice by the majority, primarily Christian Filipinos, aggravate these adjustments. Anecdotes abound about being denied space in marketplace, access to credit, employment, housing, insensitivity to cultural needs (e.g. need for a cemetery, prayer room).
Anti-Muslim Bias (Appendix 1.1)

- 55 percent think Muslims are more prone to run amok
- 47 percent think Muslims are terrorists or extremists
- 44 percent think Muslims harbor hatred toward non-Muslims
  
  ... although only 14 percent have had first hand encounters with Muslims

- Large pluralities systematically choose hypothetical alternatives with Christian-sounding names versus Muslim-sounding names as possible boarders, domestic help, employees or neighbors.

In sum, 33 to 39 percent of Filipinos are biased against Muslims. Bias appears to be associated with geographical location and age.
It may be argued that life in Diaspora may mean a significant improvement in the migrant’s quality of life. However, even in cases where this is true, care must be taken not to reduce the issue to a question of money or economics.

As we shall see, it is often not abject material conditions themselves, but rather a sense of injustice and indignity in the face of violation of rights that ignites the fuse of insurgency.
Economic cost: Moro conflict

- Losses in present and future output [Barandiaran 2003]:
  - Entire history (1970-2001): P5-7.5 billion lost annually, or P108-158 billion, or approx. 2.5 percent of the regional GDP of central and southwestern Mindanao and 0.5 percent of national GDP

- “Investment deflection” [Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005]
  - Region’s and country’s reputation as investment area suffers. On local level, investment in agriculture fails to take place
  - If forgone investment is added, economic cost is larger at P10 billion annually from 1975-2002.
Effect on investment: simple view

Fig 1.2 Investment Growth (Durable Equipment)
Economic cost: CPP conflict

- difficulty of measuring output lost from communist insurgency
  - national in potential scope
  - non-episodic character
- destruction of infrastructure and property
  - for 2002, approx. P279 million for all types of property
- revolutionary taxation a disincentive to invest
  - In 2001, from P10-20K (small landowners) to P80-120K (telcos). Total collected in 2002: Davao – P23 m; Southern Tagalog – P22 m; Central Luzon – P7 m
  - “permits to campaign” during elections
In sum, by degrading human security, persistent armed conflict affects human dev’t.

- Illustrative case: Marawi City
- Other things being equal, a province in Muslim Mindanao tends on average to have -
  - poverty incidence 32 percentage points higher
  - income per person P11,000 lower
  - basic education cohort-survival rates 31 percentage points lower
  - infant-mortality rates 15 points higher
- The same causal connection cannot be as easily demonstrated for communist insurgency. But this does not negate its effect.
Reverse: Does low human development cause conflict?

- Armed conflicts should be expected to occur and persist in areas that are materially deprived, broadly measured by income poverty and income inequality. However, often not even the most abject conditions by themselves cause grievances, much less revolutions.
- People must perceive and be convinced that something “higher” and “better” than their present condition is indeed possible. The revolutionary argument is that deprivation can be relieved and injustice remedied only by pursuing some promised alternative.

Rather than hardship alone, the sense of deprivation and injustice lie at the heart of armed conflict.
This is demonstrated empirically

- Frequency of armed conflict is NOT directly related to
  - Incidence of income poverty
  - Aggregate measures of income inequality

- It IS directly related to
  - Disparities reliable water-supply
  - Access to electric power
  - Attainment in adult education

That is, the widespread availability of these services to mainstream communities serves as an adverse point of comparison for neglected and desolate areas, turning experienced hardship into palpable grievances, making people receptive to competing state ideologies.
Other ‘predictors’

- ‘Minoritization’ - frequency of armed conflict would be LESS where a high proportion of the original settlers remains.

- Average income of the middle class - beginning with low incomes, the incidence of armed conflict first rises before falling as the average income of the middle class rises. Implications:
  - Lack of insurgency may not mean those communities are not victimized. Rather, they may be ‘too poor to rebel’.
  - Increasing incomes will not mechanically cause insurgencies to die away. There is a threshold of improvement which intervention must clear.
Average income of middle class and number of armed encounters

Figure 1.4 Per capita spending and average number of encounters for mixed and minority provinces
Other ‘predictors’

- A history of past conflict and rate of accomplishment of land reform are also good predictors.
  - The former represents the “supply side” of revolutionary organizations and the typical cycle of violence
  - Whether land reform is important because it is a strategic issue for human development or because it is an advocacy of the communist insurgency is an open question.
  - In a rough counterfactual exercise, payback from completion of CARP does less well than improving adult education in reducing the incidence of armed conflict.
### Table 1.10 Probability of at least 1 encounter per year (after 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Majority</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Base run (2003)</strong></td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With interventions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finish CARP scope</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase access to electricity to 80%</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase adult education to 6 years</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove disparity in water supply</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase road density</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moving forward

The *Institutional peace-building* approach accommodates the framework of human development

- Requires the government to re-examine itself and society’s priorities against insurgent demands and decide on institutional change, where these are called for.
- Government must agree in principle to reexamine itself and be weighed and measured using a scale or metric against which the potential and outcomes of mainstream society can be laid down.

Human development and human security are first principles the validity of which should be difficult to dispute by either side and which provide a common metric for progress which transcends opposed ideologies and social systems.
1. Ensure policy consistency and coherence.

- Need a **common framework** for peace that can be consistently adopted across administrations, broad enough to provide a common ground for dialogue, general enough to gain wide assent. *Human development/human security provide such a framework.*

- Must be supported by a **national constituency** for peace (civil society orgs, media, business sector)
  - Peace efforts have been almost exclusively the domain of designated specialists and negotiators.
  - The Moro conflict for instance cannot remain an exclusively “Mindanao issue”. It is a pressing question of human development that touches all Filipinos.
  - *We all contribute to the problem; we must be part of the solution.*
2. Legislate a national peace policy

- Government’s commitment to peace must be elevated to become enduring
- Specific legislation can/should
  - outline broad principles to guide any administration’s approach (e.g. 6 paths to peace)
  - create a permanent mechanism with process for accountability to Congress
3. The Moro armed conflicts...

Track 1: Address gaps in and learn from implementation of the MNLF peace agreement.

- Implement all practicable and deliverable aspects of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement and RA 9054
- Encourage a wide-ranging process of consultation among ARMM constituents then a referendum on the question of what political expression self-rule might take.

Track 2: Give the highest priority to negotiations with the MILF. Conclusion of peace between the GRP and MILF will be the single boldest step to be taken for peace in our time.

- Gains already realized must be preserved and built upon even as gaps are filled with regard to the MILF’s aspirations for a distinctly Islamic way of life and form of self-rule (e.g. ancestral domain, the issue of separation of church and state)
The Moro armed conflicts...

Track 3: Delineate terrorism clearly and deal with it firmly without prejudicing larger peace process.

- GRP has done well to draw a formal line of distinction between the MNLF/MILF on one hand, and the ASG and other terrorist groups on the other. Both MNLF and MILF have condemned the ASG as ‘un-Islamic’.

- However, a major impact of globalized “war on terror” has been to heighten the importance of military and mailed-fist solutions in general. Military/police action has been applied not only against real terrorist groups but also against mainline insurgencies.
“Any people that would give up liberty for a little temporary safety deserves neither liberty nor safety”

- Benjamin Franklin
4. On the CPP-NPA …

- Resume negotiations while instituting reforms in parallel.
  - Resume negotiations and reaffirm agreements already concluded, i.e. on human rights and international humanitarian law.
  - Real challenge is the resolution of a primarily political issue: a reasonable guarantee that the radical Left can join the mainstream of political life and advocate its aims armed with nothing more than the “weapons of criticism” rather than resorting to “criticism by weapons”
  - Sharpest question posed by the insurgency: is this system capable of reform? Central to the entire issue is the conduct of elections.
5. Undertake electoral and security sector reforms

... which serve not only the cause of the peace process but society at large

- electoral/governance reforms
  - Adherence to formal rules; depoliticization of police and military; restrictions on campaign spending and finance; regulating media for partisan purposes; enacting ban on political dynasties; promoting party and platform-based politics

- security sector (police, military, justice system, intelligence service) reforms
  - Pursue recommendations of the Davide and Feliciano commissions
  - Reorient sector underscoring respect for human rights, cultural sensitivity
6. Charter change?

- Possibility of charter change opens door *in principle* to wider range of options to end armed conflict.

- However, *unilateralism* of the government and the majority population is a downside risk: unless the peace process is explicitly coordinated, constitutional proposals will most likely be adopted that are not the product of negotiation and agreement (nor will this be the first time it has happened).

(Note: This is *not* to say that the PHDR or the HDN endorses charter change.)
7. Undertake human development investments – especially education investments

The state of peace and security is indivisible. However, human security, like human development is also a right, an *end in itself*. Thus socio-economic reforms that address deprivations/ inequities in health, knowledge, access to safe water, and so forth are both necessary and desirable *in and of themselves*.

It is reassuring however that empirical evidence exists to show that investments in these same arenas -- especially in education – are potent policy handles to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict.
Thank you.

www.hdn.org.ph